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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Brown asserts that the State has failed to demonstrate error in the district 
court's order granting his motion to suppress the State's evidence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Christopher Brown was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to 
deliver based upon evidence found during a search of Mr. Brown's vehicle. (R., p.12.) 
The State's charge was the result of a traffic stop that allegedly uncovered a quantity of 
marijuana and various items of drug paraphernalia, including a scale and plastic 
baggies. (R., pp.11-12.) Thereafter, Mr. Brown moved to suppress the evidence, 
arguing, in part, that he was seized in violation of his rights under the Fourth 
Amendment, and the evidence gathered against him should be suppressed as fruits of 
his unlawful seizure. (R., pp.38-39.) As additional testimony was deemed necessary 
before a written memorandum in support of Mr. Brown's motion to suppress could 
feasibly be prepared, the district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress at 
which Officer Cwik testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the seizure and 
arrest of Mr. Brown. ( See generally, 4/30/12 Tr.) After hearing the testimony, the 
district court set a briefing schedule for the parties. (4/30/12 Tr., p.41, L.24 - p.43, 
L.11.) 
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In his memorandum in support of this motion, Mr. Brown raised two challenges to 
his detention and the search of his vehicle. 1 First, Mr. Brown asserted that the officer 
lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal wrongdoing at 
the time of the stop. (R., pp.65-68.) Second, Mr. Brown asserted that any consent to 
search, if consent was given at all, was constitutionally invalid. (R., pp.68-71.) The 
district court granted the motion to suppress and made oral findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.2 (5/24/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.1-7; R., pp.74-75.) It stated as follows: 
1. On January 27, 2012, near midnight, Officer Cwik observed a vehicle in 
the Hastings parking lot, which is in Coeur d'Alene just north of Appleway. 
The officer saw a particular van that was missing its rear window. It had a 
plastic covering over the window. The van was idling, and the officer 
observed that he could not see through the plastic covering in the rear 
window and determined that that was a violation of state traffic laws. 
2. Officer Cwik testified that he watched the vehicle for approximately ten 
minutes and then saw the vehicle leave the parking lot and drive in what 
the officer determined to be a somewhat erratic or eccentric manner. That 
is, the route the vehicle drove when it left the parking lot in a westbound 
fashion than turned north on Government Way. It turned east on Anton, 
which is the very next street up. It turned south on Fourth Street, which 
was the very next street it could come to. It turned west on Appleway 
again. It turned north on Government Way again. Essentially, the vehicle 
went in a circle around the big block, until the officer stopped the vehicle in 
the parking lot of a business off of Government Way. 
3. Officer Cwik testified that he spoke with the driver and obtained the 
driver's license, registration and insurance from Mr. Brown. He ran the 
information regarding the driver of the vehicle through the Coeur d'Alene 
police computer system to find out if there were any wants or warrants out 
for Mr. Brown and the status of his driver's license. 
1 Mr. Brown also raised as an issue whether his cell phone could be searched without a 
warrant; however, the district court did not rule on or otherwise address this issue in its 
oral findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R., p.72.) Respondent reserves the right 
to re-raise this issue in the event that the district court's order suppressing the evidence 
is reversed and the case is remanded back to the district court. 
2 The district court announced that its oral pronouncement constituted its findings of fact 
and conclusions of law that supported its decision. (5/24/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.4-7.) 
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4. Officer Cwik asked Mr. Brown to explain the driving pattern, and 
Mr. Brown explained that he lives on Anton, but was distracted by talking 
to a friend, on the telephone. 
5. Officer Cwik also testified that he had obtained information about 
drugs being sold from a vehicle in that location fitting the description of 
Mr. Brown's vehicle. There was no more specificity provided other than 
that generalized understanding by Officer Cwik. 
6. The district court noted that, based on the videotape, Officer Cwik 
received an envelope from the driver that presumably contained 
Mr. Brown's registration, license and insurance information. The officer 
then left Mr. Brown still seated in the vehicle and returned to his patrol car 
with the envelope. 
7. After Officer Cwik determined that there were no wants or warrants out 
for Mr. Brown, he asked Mr. Brown if he would consent to a search of his 
vehicle. Mr. Brown consented to the search. The district court found that 
Mr. Brown's driver's license was not returned to him at the time that he 
was asked and granted consent to search the vehicle. The district court 
found that Officer Cwik spoke to Mr. Brown for about 30 seconds before 
Mr. Brown exited the vehicle and Officer Cwik began to search. 
8. During a search of the vehicle, Officer Cwik found marijuana. 
9. The district court concluded that there was a reasonable basis for 
Officer Cwik to stop the vehicle. There was reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that a traffic infraction was occurring; specifically being the 
plastic that was not able to be seen through on the rear window-that was 
the basis for a traffic stop. 
10. The district court concluded that the reason for the traffic stop-the 
covered up rear window-was over at the time that the officer returned to 
contact with Mr. Brown, and that the traffic stop was then extended. 
11. Mr. Brown was not free to go. Mr. Brown did not have his driver's 
license in hand or his registration or his insurance, and the traffic stop was 
extended for no articulable reason other than for the officer to ask for 
consent to search the vehicle. 
12. The district court found the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in 
State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647 (Ct. App. 2002) instructive in that an 
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. "An individual may not be 
detained, even momentarily, without reasonable objective grounds for so 
doing. A consent to search given during an illegal detention is tainted by 
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the illegality and therefore is an ineffective consent." Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491 (1983). 
13. The district court found that because Officer Cwik kept a hold of the 
driver's license and registration and insurance, beyond what was 
necessary for dealing with the covered up window in the back, such 
constituted an unlawful and illegal extension of Mr. Brown's detention, 
which rendered ineffective the consent Mr. Brown gave to Officer Cwik. 
14. The district court found that there was no valid consent and anything 
found in Mr. Brown's vehicle would be suppressed. 
15. The district court reviewed the video and found that the consent for 
search was requested and granted without the information being handed 
back to Mr. Brown-he was not free to go and therefore his detention was 
extended without a reasonable basis to do so. 
(5/24/12 Tr., p.5, L.8 - p.13, L.8.) 
The district court granted Mr. Brown's motion to suppress, finding that Officer 
Cwik unlawfully extended the traffic stop of Mr. Brown for no articulable reason other 
than the officer asking Mr. Brown for consent to search his vehicle. (5/24/12 Tr., p.5, 
Ls.1-2, p.10, Ls.16-18.) The district court found that Mr. Brown's consent to search was 
given during an illegal detention and was therefore tainted by the illegality, rendering it 
an ineffective consent. (5/24/12 Tr., p.11, L.15 - p.12, L. 1.) The district court granted 
the motion to suppress and entered a separate order dismissing the case. (R., pp.75, 
78.) 
The State appealed. (R., pp.80-82). 
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ISSUE 




The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Brown's Motion To Suppress The State's 
Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Brown moved the district court to suppress the evidence against him 
because the seizure of Mr. Brown violated his constitutional rights. This Court should 
affirm the order granting Mr. Brown's motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, Idaho appellate 
Courts apply a bifurcated standard of review: the Court will accept the trial court's 
findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous, but the Court will freely review the 
trial court's application of constitutional principles to the facts found. State v. Purdum, 
147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009). 
C. The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Brown's Motion To Suppress The 
State's Evidence 
The State has not challenged any of the district court's factual findings in this 
appeal. As such, the question for this Court is whether, in light of the facts found by the 
district court, the district court erred in granting Mr. Brown's motion to suppress the 
State's evidence. Mr. Brown submits that the district court's ruling granting his motion 
to suppress was amply supported both by the evidence and by governing case law, and 
that this Court should therefore affirm the district court. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures to the people 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Willoughby, 147 
Idaho 482, 486 (2009). The protections of the Fourth Amendment have been 
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incorporated to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009). 
"When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the burden of 
proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable." Id. at 811. In addition, 
even brief detentions of individuals must meet with the Fourth Amendment's 
requirement of reasonableness. Id. This means that the detention must be both 
justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
originally justified the interference in the first place. Id. 
1. The Detention Was Unlawfully Extended 
Limited detentions of individuals may be permissible where there is a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion on the part of the officer that the person detained has committed, 
or is about to commit, a crime. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. However, the officer must be 
able to point to specific, articulable facts in support of the detention - and this requires 
more than a mere hunch on the part of the officer or "inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion." Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). Whether an 
officer possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion is evaluated by examining the 
totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of, or before, the detention. 
Id. Moreover, the "scope of the detention must be narrowly tailored to its underlying 
justification," and the investigative detention cannot last any longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 
These same standards apply where the detention at issue is a traffic stop. See, 
e.g., State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App. 2005). 'The question whether an 
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investigative detention is reasonable requires a dual inquiry into (1) whether the officer's 
action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it is reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id. While the 
purpose of a stop is not inevitably fixed at the point of the initiation of the traffic stop, 
and may evolve based upon additional information coming to light, any extension of the 
detention must be carefully tailored to the underlying justification of the stop. Id. at 562-
563. 
In this case, the State has challenged the district court's determination that the 
stop of Mr. Brown for an equipment violation was unlawfully extended, and therefore the 
evidence obtained as a result of this detention must be suppressed. 
When officers effectuate a traffic stop, the detention of the driver must be based 
on reasonable suspicion and "must also be reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the stop in the first place." State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 
59 (Ct. App. 2011 ). The duration of a traffic stop cannot be extended once the purpose 
of the stop is completed. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650 (Ct. App. 2002). It is 
clear that, "if an officer questions a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after 
the purpose of the stop has been fulfilled, the questioning, no matter how short, extends 
the duration of the stop and is an unwarranted intrusion upon the privacy and liberty of 
the vehicle's occupants." State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). There are 
two exceptions to this rule. First, if the officer observes objective, specific, and 
particular facts to give rise to a particularized suspicion of criminal activity, the purpose 
of the stop may evolve, allowing the otherwise impermissible extended detention and 
investigation. See, e.g., State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916 (Ct. App. 2001). A 
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mere hunch or unparticularized suspicion on the part of the officer is insufficient to 
trigger this exception. See State v. Swindle, 148 Idaho 61, 64 (Ct. App. 2009). Second, 
the encounter may evolve into a consensual encounter, but such evolution only occurs 
when an officer returns the driver's identification and there is no "further show of 
authority which would convey a message that the individual is not free to 
leave." Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650. If the encounter does not become consensual and 
the officer prolongs the detention, the officer violates the defendant's constitutional 
rights. Id.; Bordeaux, 148 Idaho at 8. Further, the burden is on the State to establish 
that the seizure was based on reasonable suspicion and sufficiently limited in scope and 
duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho at 8. 
It is clear that, "if an officer questions a driver about matters unrelated to the 
traffic stop after the purpose of the stop has been fulfilled, the questioning, no matter 
how short, extends the duration of the stop and is an unwarranted intrusion upon the 
privacy and liberty of the vehicle's occupants." Bordeaux, 148 Idaho at 8; but c.f. 
State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that where the defendant was not 
unlawfully detained at the moment the officer asked for permission to search, the 
additional second or two that the officer took to ask for consent and which the defendant 
replied in the affirmative was objectively reasonable). 
In this case, the district court found that Officer Cwik had a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that a traffic infraction was occurring, but that Officer Cwik 
unlawfully extended the duration of the stop, which rendered Mr. Brown's consent to 
search invalid. (5/24/12 Tr., p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.3, p.11, Ls.15-22.) The district court 
9 
correctly found that the encounter between Officer Cwik and Mr. Brown was not 
consensual when Officer Cwik asked permission to search the vehicle. 
The State asserts that an officer may ask a driver limited questions even though 
the subject matter is unrelated to the purpose of the initial stop. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
In State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 838 (Ct. App. 2000), a case not cited by the appellant, but 
which this Court may find somewhat similar, the officer had written a citation for a traffic 
infraction-speeding-and spent some time explaining to Mr. Silva the citation and how 
to pay it. Id. 134 Idaho at 853. After which, while holding both the citation and the 
defendant's driver's license in his hand, he asked for permission to search the vehicle. 
Id. Thus the purpose of the stop, to issue a traffic citation, had not yet concluded when 
the officer asked consent to search. Id. 
Here, the district court found that the purpose of the stop was over when Officer 
Cwik returned to make contact with Mr. Brown after running his documents. (5/24/12 
Tr., p.10, Ls.7-11.) The facts in this case are unlike the facts in Silva, where the Court 
of Appeals determined that the purpose of the stop was not yet over until the officer 
handed Mr. Silva the citation. Silva, 134 Idaho at 853. Although Officer Cwik 
permissibly obtained Mr. Brown's driver's license, registration and insurance 
information,3 he unreasonably delayed returning the documents to Mr. Brown.4 (5/24/12 
3 This Court has stated that once a legitimate traffic stop has occurred, "nothing in the 
Fourth Amendment ... preclude[s] the officer from routinely asking the motorist to exhibit 
his driver's license, the vehicle registration and an insurance certificate." State v. Reed, 
107 Idaho 162, 165 (Ct. App. 1984). 
4 The district court calculated the length of the delay was "about 30 seconds;" however, 
based on a review of Defendant's Exhibit A, the respondent calculates the time from 
when Officer Cwik returned to speak with Mr. Brown after running his documentation 
and the time the officers commenced searching the vehicle was well over a minute and 
one-half. 
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Tr., p.13, Ls.1-8.) The district court correctly concluded that Officer Cwik's delay 
unlawfully extended the duration of the stop. (5/24/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.11-18.) 
The burden was on the State to establish that the seizure was limited in scope 
and duration in order to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure under Florida v. 
Royer. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho at 8. The State did not meet its burden in this case. The 
district court concluded: 
So this Court finds that by Officer Cwik maintaining and hanging onto the 
driver's license and the necessary paperwork, registration and insurance, 
of Mr. Brown beyond that which was necessary for his dealing with the 
covered up window in the back, was an unlawful and illegal extension of 
that detention, which makes ineffective the consent that Mr. Brown gave to 
Officer Cwik. 
(5/24/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.15-22.) 
Further, unlike the stop in Silva, this delay was considerably longer than "an 
additional second or two" which the Court of Appeals found permissible in Silva. Silva, 
134 Idaho at 853. There the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the question itself did not 
make any further detention unlawful, and that the additional detention of a second or 
two did not unreasonably extend the duration of the stop. Id. (emphasis added) 
Here, as the district court correctly found, the reason for the lawful encounter had 
ended, yet Officer Cwik continued to maintain control over the envelope containing 
Mr. Brown's driver's license for about 30 seconds after he returned to Mr. Brown's car-
30 seconds during which Officer Cwik spoke to Mr. Brown and obtained consent to 
search his vehicle.5 
5 Although the district court noted that Officer Cwik spoke with Mr. Brown for "about 30 
seconds" before Mr. Brown exited the vehicle (5/24/12 Tr., p.9, L.10), it appears that 
Mr. Brown and Officer Cwik were engaging in conversation not related to the issue of 
the search-they appeared to be looking at something and discussing the object-for 
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The district court concluded that the reason for the traffic stop was the covered-
up rear window, and the reason for that traffic stop was over at the time that the officer 
returned to contact with Mr. Brown. (5/24/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.7-12.) The district court found 
that the traffic stop was then extended by Officer Cwik for no articulable reason other 
than for Officer Cwik to ask for consent to search the vehicle. (5/24/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.16-
18.) After he ran the information and noted that there were no warrants or arrests for 
Mr. Brown, all that remained for him to do was to hand the envelope containing the 
driver's license back to Mr. Brown. Unlike the circumstances in Silva, there were no 
further explanations the officer needed to make regarding the reason the defendant had 
been initially seized-in Silva, the officer legitimately explained the citation to Mr. Silva. 
Just the act of handing the envelope containing Mr. Brown's driver's license back was 
all Officer Cwik could lawfully do-otherwise he was unreasonably detaining Mr. Brown 
as he had already explained the basis for the stop, issued a warning, and conversed 
with Mr. Brown regarding the unusual driving pattern-he had no reasonable and 
articulable suspicion which justified further detention. Because he continued to detain 
Mr. Brown after the purposes for which he stopped Mr. Brown had extinguished, the 
district court correctly found that Officer Cwik unlawfully extended the detention. 
2. Mr. Brown's Extended Detention Was Not Supported By Reasonable 
Suspicion Of Other Possible Crimes 
The Court reviews de novo constitutional principles as they relate to the facts 
found by the district court. Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 485-486; State v. Parkinson, 135 
Idaho 357, 360 (Ct. App. 2000) (addressing for the first time on appeal the issue of 
an additional minute before Mr. Brown stepped away from the vehicle and Officer Cwik 
proceeded to enter it. (Defendant's Exhibit A.) 
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whether the officer's questioning and the use of a drug detection dog caused the 
detention to be unnecessarily intrusive because the reasonableness of the detention 
was "a question of law requiring our independent review"). In addition, where the district 
court's order is correct, but on an alternate legal theory, this Court will affirm on the 
correct grounds. State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704 (1996). Because the officer 
lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion for the initial seizure of Mr. Brown, Officer Cwik 
unlawfully extended Mr. Brown's detention, the extended detention was not supported 
by reasonable suspicion of other crimes, and Mr. Brown's consent to search the vehicle 
was not validly given, Mr. Brown submits that this Court should likewise affirm the 
district court on these grounds. 
The State also argues in the alternative, claiming that even if the detention was 
extended, such was supported by reasonable suspicion of other possible crimes. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) This argument is unsupported by the facts of this case. The 
State relies on the briefing Officer Cwik received that someone in a vehicle matching the 
description of Mr. Brown's was reportedly selling drugs, combined with the unusual 
driving pattern in an attempt to establish objectively reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity was afoot such that Officer Cwik could expand the scope of his investigation and 
inquire about the drug related allegations. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-9.) However, a 
roundabout driving pattern is insufficient to establish a basis to pull someone over. See 
State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109 (2013) (holding that driving around the block on a 
Friday night does not rise to the level of specific, articulable facts that justify an 
investigatory stop). Further, even Officer Cwik admitted such. (4/30/12 Tr., p.27, Ls.16-
18.) Additionally, although Officer Cwik testified that he was aware of a report that a 
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vehicle matching the description of Mr. Brown's vehicle had been involved in drug 
transactions in that location, there was no objectively reasonable basis, and no 
independent police investigation done, to lend credence to this claim. As quoted by the 
State in its Appellant's Brief, the Idaho Court of Appeals, in State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 
99, 101 (Ct. App. 2000), held that, "[a]n anonymous tip, standing alone, is generally not 
enough to justify a stop." Id. Here, we have an unverified report, without any indication 
as to source, reliability, or age of information, and seemingly devoid of independent 
police investigation to lend credence to the claim. See State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980 
(Ct. App. 2004) (holding that, when evaluating sufficiency of information to establish 
reasonable suspicion to justify further investigative detention, little or no weight can be 
given to information where the State presented no evidence showing the source, 
reliability, or age of information, nor evidence that any of this information from unnamed 
sources had been verified by independent police work). Such is insufficient to establish 
an objectively reasonable, articulable basis to extend a detention, even combined with 
an absurd driving pattern. 
D. Alternatively, Mr. Brown Asserts That The Initial Detention Was Unlawful 
As for the officer's initial basis for the stop, Mr. Brown asserts that his initial 
detention was unlawful as it was not based upon an objectively reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. The district court found that "there 
was a reasonable basis for Officer Cwik to stop the vehicle. That there was reasonable 
and articulable suspicion that a traffic infraction was occurring; specifically being the 
plastic that was not able to be seen through on the rear window, but that was the basis 
for a traffic stop." (5/24/12 Tr., p.9, L.23 - p.10, L.3.) However, there was no citation 
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issued, and no code section referenced at the hearing on Mr. Brown's motion to 
suppress. 
This is because there is no basis for a conclusion that Mr. Brown was, in fact, 
violating the law. Merely having a covered rear window, standing alone, does not 
establish a violation of Idaho law. 
Idaho Code§ 49-943(1) provides: 
No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any sign, poster, or other 
nontransparent material upon the front windshield, side wings, or side or 
rear windows of the vehicle which obstructs the driver's clear view of the 
highway or any intersecting highway. 
Idaho Code§ 49-943(1). 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Cwik stated that the opaque 
covering on Mr. Brown's back window was a violation of the "traffic code," but could not 
state what portion of the code was being violated.6 (4/30/12 Tr., p.25, Ls.21-25.) 
According to his testimony, there were no other facts he considered when detaining 
Mr. Brown-the purported traffic code violation was the only basis for the stop.7 Yet, 
Officer Cwik followed Mr. Brown for a period of time, and did not note that Mr. Brown 
was driving poorly, or that the lack of visibility out his back window affected his driving or 
obstructed his views of the roadway. (4/30/12 Tr., p.9, Ls.3-10.) In fact, Mr. Brown did 
not commit any traffic violations while driving in the roundabout manner, and Officer 
Cwik testified that he did not have any other basis for initiating the traffic stop, thereby 
6 Appellant erroneously posits that the district court, as part of its findings, found that the 
piece of plastic taped across the back window violated Idaho Code § 49-943. 
~Appellant's Brief, p.5.) This is unsupported by the record. 
As the officer readily admitted, an eccentric driving pattern does not establish criminal 
wrongdoing-he stopped Mr. Brown due to the supposed traffic code violation. (4/30/12 
Tr., p.27, Ls.16-18.). 
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discrediting any inference that Mr. Brown's view of the highway was obstructed in any 
way by the opaque piece of plastic covering his rear window. (4/30/12 Tr., p.26, Ls.10-
16.) Finally, Mr. Brown did have two side mirrors, as established by the exhibits entered 
into the record during the suppression hearing. (R., p.67; Plaintiff's Exhibit No.1; 
Defendant's Exhibit A.) Thus there is no support in the record for Officer Cwik's belief 
that Mr. Brown was in violation of a traffic code. The stop was not based on an 
objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, and all evidence 
obtained as a result of the unlawful stop must be suppressed. 
As the district court correctly found, Officer Cwik unlawfully extended the duration 
of the stop to ask consent to search the vehicle. Additionally, Mr. Brown's initial seizure 
was unreasonable and, thus, violated his Fourth Amendment rights and his right under 
Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Because the discovery of the evidence used against Mr. Brown was the 
product of his illegal seizure, it was rightfully suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478-488 (1963). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Brown respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's Order 
Granting Motion to Suppress. 
DATED this 1st day of July, 2013. 
SALL rooLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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